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ABSTRACT
A choice-theoretic model of household decision-making with respect to care-giving time
allocations and the use of publicly and privately financed home care services is proposed.  Predictions
concerning the effect of increased availability of publicly financed home care services on home care
utilization, informal care-giving, and health status are derived.  These predictions are assessed through
use of Canadian inter-provincial survey data on home care use and care-giving that are matched with data
on home care funding for the period 1992 to 1998.  Increased availability of publicly financed home care
is associated with an increase in its utilization and a decline in informal care-giving, with this effect more
pronounced among lower income Canadians.  While self-reported health status was positively correlated
with the increased availability of publicly financed home care, the perceived need for home care was
invariant to this change.
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1.0 Introduction   
  One of the dominant shifts in the delivery of health care over the past decade has 
been in the place of care, particularly from the hospital to the home. Whereas individuals 
used to spend prolonged periods in hospital for treatment and recovery, hospital stays 
have dramatically decreased (or ceased altogether) and many aspects of care now take 
place at home (Coyte and McKeever, 2001). An important implication of this change in 
the care setting is its effect on who pays for and who delivers care. In both the United 
States and Canada, hospital care provided to the elderly is explicitly covered under the 
Medicare Program and the Canada Health Act, respectively. However, in-home care is 
not necessarily covered by public insurance in either country. More significantly, once 
outside the hospital, the onus on family and friends to assist with, or even take 
responsibility for the provision (and financing) of care is greater. As such, the public-
private financing of in-home care has become a prominent issue for health policy makers. 
  Despite a dramatic increase in the provision of in-home care, there are wide 
variations in the services used.  In many jurisdictions, under the in-home service 
designation, an array of agencies and providers participate in the provision of a complex 
range of health professional and lifestyle enhancement services to a variety of recipients.  
The range of services is large and includes nursing, social work, physiotherapy, speech 
language pathology, personal support care, audiology, occupational therapy, and meals on 
wheels.  While most care recipients receive these services to prevent or retard the 
deterioration of health and to assist them to maintain independence in the community, others 
receive a more specialized variety of rehabilitation services following hospitalization.  These 
services “enable clients, incapacitated in whole or in part, to live at home, often with the    2   
effect of preventing, delaying, or substituting for long term or acute care alternatives” 
(Health Canada, 1999). 
In the last twenty-five years, Canadian public home care expenditures have 
increased at an average annual compound rate of 17.4 percent from $62 million in fiscal 
year 1975 to $2,096 million in fiscal year 1997 (Health Canada, 1999).  This increase was 
more than double the equivalent annual growth rate of 8.3 percent for total public health 
spending, (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 1999) and represents an extension of 
provincial health insurance to services and settings not encompassed by the principles of the 
Canada Health Act.  Since this Act stipulates the terms and conditions of physician and 
hospital service provision that the provinces must abide by to ensure that they receive their 
full share of federal transfers, the exemption of in-home services from such conditions 
provide provinces with discretion in their allocation of health expenditures.  Thus, while 
Canadian public per capita spending on in-home services was $69, in 1997, there was 
almost a three-fold variation in spending by comparing New Brunswick, Newfoundland, 
Ontario and Manitoba, where per capita spending exceeded $90, to Quebec and Prince 
Edward Island, where spending was less than $40 (Coyte and McKeever, 2001). 
As public programs expand into what was previously a privately dominated 
segment of the health system, families may alter their behavior in order to take advantage 
of these public offerings.  In some cases, these public offerings substitute for services that 
were previously funded privately through either direct payments or time commitments by 
family and friends.  In other circumstances, this extension of public coverage may meet 
some previously unmet need, and thereby, increase overall utilization as these services 
complement existing care.    3   
  This paper investigates household responses to publicly funded programs for in-
home care. The paper begins with a choice-theoretic model of household decision making 
when one member requires in-home care. The paper then uses Canadian data on home 
care use and care-giving matched with provincial level data on home care funding to test 
the model’s implications. Our findings suggest that family behavior is consistent with the 
simple economic model. Increases in the generosity of public programs affect home care 
utilization and the amount of family care-giving undertaken. In addition, increases in 
publicly funded in-home care are correlated with improvements in the health of home 
care recipients, but perceived needs for home care are invariant to this change. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous literature on 
public provision of in-home care and household decision-making.  Section 3 outlines a 
model of household decision-making that incorporates in-home care.  Section 4 describes 
the public home care programs in Canada.  Section 5 outlines the data used in the 
analysis. Section 6 outlines our empirical specification and trends in home care use.  
Section 7 presents our findings with respect to health status, while Section 8 reports on 
the propensity to engage in care-giving.  Section 9 provides a brief conclusion. 
2.0 Previous  Literature 
Much of the literature on the impact of public health subsidies and programs for 
the elderly on care-giving, living arrangements and use of in-home services comes from 
the United States.  This research has focused primarily on the effects of Medicaid 
reimbursement for nursing home facilities and various state level policies designed to 
combat the moral hazard problem that Medicaid reimbursements may create.    4   
Cutler and Sheiner (1993) examine the effect of government nursing home 
policies on institutionalization rates and on the amount of care received in the 
community. The authors examine both the price differential between Medicaid and the 
private market, as well the ability of some higher income elderly beneficiaries to receive 
Medicare support for nursing home care. They find that in states with more liberal 
Medicaid rules, the higher income elderly are more likely to use a nursing home. In states 
with larger underpayments the poor appear to have reduced access to nursing homes. 
They find that as Medicaid support increases, informal family care decreases.  
Ettner (1994) examines whether Medicaid home care benefits affect nursing home 
entry and the use of formal and informal care. Home care subsidies were found to reduce 
the rate of nursing home use for the elderly in need of long-term care and resulted in a 
substantial replacement of informal care with formal care for non-medical services. 
Pezzin et al (1996) use data from the Channeling experiment, a national 
assessment of expanded public financing for in-home care conducted from 1982-85
1.  
They found that more generous public home care programs lowered the probability that 
an individual would live in a nursing home, and increased the probability that unmarried 
individuals would live independently
2. They found that the substitution between formal 
and informal care was small, but the effect on hours of care was large and dominated the 
overall effect of subsidized formal care on informal care. 
Hoerger et al (1996) quantify the use of state policies that encourage the elderly to 
stay in their communities.  They use the National Long Term Care Survey and exploit the 
                                                 
1 Pezzin et al suggest seeing Kemper et al. (1988) for a description of the of the Channeling experiment. 
2 Previous research using the Channeling Demonstration by Christianson (1988) and Woolridge and Schore  
(1988), however, found only a small effect/no effect of the formal home care program on informal care or 
institutionalization.  Pezzin et al. argue that their result comes from modeling living and care arrangements 
jointly and having examined shifts in living arrangements in the community.      5   
variation in Medicaid State policies for formal in-home care and care in nursing homes. 
They found that Medicaid subsidies affected the choice of living arrangements. A 
loosening of financial requirements for Medicaid eligibility for nursing home care 
increased the use of nursing homes. However, subsidizing home health services simply 
increased the probability that individuals lived independently from their children rather 
than affecting the probability of institutionalization.  
While much of the literature has examined the effects of various policies on the 
types of care received, there is little evidence of the effects of policy on the health of the 
individuals receiving care. In this paper, we not only consider how provincial home care 
policies affect care-giving, living arrangements and the use of in-home services, we also 
examine their effects on the self-reported health status of care recipients.  
3.0  A model of family home care decisions 
  We consider a simple model of decision making using a representative household 
with both care receivers and care-givers. The purpose of the model is to determine what 
testable implications arise from implementing or increasing public home care programs. 
Households allocate time and financial resources subject to resource and technology 
constraints. In a two-person household, where one person is a care recipient and the other 
is a healthy care-giver, household utility is defined by the function: 
(1)  ) | , , ( τ A L X U,  
where X represents market goods and services, L leisure time, A the ability of care 
recipients to perform activities of daily living, and τ represents household preferences. 
  A care recipient’s performance ability is defined by the production technology: 
(2)  A(M(m, m*), C | H),    6   
where M is total formal home care, composed of publicly funded care up to a maximum 
allocation of  m, and privately financed care,  m*.  C is care-giving time performed by the 
other family member, and H is the care recipient’s health status. 
  Time and financial constraints are satisfied if: 
(3) PxX + Pm* + (P – s)m = V + W(T – L – C), 
where Px is the unit cost of X, P is the unit cost of private care, m*, (P-s) is the unit out-
of-pocket cost of public care, m,  s is the unit subsidy for public care, V is non-wage 
income, W is the unit cost of time, and finally, T is the total time for leisure, care-giving 
and labor market work. 
  To simplify the household decision problem, we assume that public and private 
in-home care are perfect substitutes, so that equation (2) may be re-written as: 
(2’)  ) | A(M, H C,  
where M is now just the sum of public and private care.  Consequently, the household’s 
resource constraint, equation (3), may be re-written as: 
(3’)  sm L T W V WC PM X Px + − + = + + ) (.  
The household then maximizes utility, equation (1), by selecting M, C, and L subject to 
technology, equation (2’), and resource, equation (3’), constraints. 
  The household’s optimization problem can be broken down into three stages. 
First, the household selects performance ability, A*, where the marginal benefit of greater 
ability just offsets the marginal cost of its production.  Second, the household cost-
effectively selects production inputs, M and C, in order to achieve the optimal level of 
performance ability, A*.  Finally, leisure time, L, is selected where the marginal benefit 
of increased leisure just equals the marginal cost of forgone market goods and services.    7   
  While this model is a simplification of complex household decision-making 
processes, it may be used to examine the effects of changes in the availability of publicly 
financed home care.  However, the effects of this increase depend on the initial 
equilibrium.  Three household care-giving equilibria are possible.  Each depend on the 
relationship between the total use of in-home care, M, and the publicly financed 
maximum allocation for care recipients, m.  First, in a low in-home care equilibrium, 
M<m, the use of home care is less than the care recipient’s publicly financed maximum 
allocation of care, m.  This occurs where the subsidized unit price for publicly financed 
care, (P-s), is sufficiently large relative to the household’s willingness to pay.  In this 
case, the care recipient’s full allocation of publicly financed care, m, is not exhausted.  
Second, in a medium (or corner solution) utilization equilibrium, M=m, the household 
fully exhausts the publicly financed allocation of care, m, but the unit cost of private in-
home care, P, is too large for utilization, m*=0.  Third, in the high utilization (or interior) 
equilibrium, M>m, the household fully exhausts its publicly financed allocation, m, and 
supplements this care with privately financed care, m*>0. 
  If we were to focus on an equilibrium in which the care recipient supplemented 
publicly financed care with privately financed care, an increase in the allocation of 
publicly financed care, m, is tantamount to an increase in the household’s non-wage 
income.  Specifically, this change increases the optimal level of performance ability, A, 
through an income effect; it increases inputs of care-giving time, C, and total in-home 
care, M, if these inputs are normal inputs to the production process, as relative input 
prices are invariant to this increase in m; and it increases the consumption of leisure time 
and market goods and services through an income effect.  In this case, an increase in    8   
publicly financed care, m, results in a complementary increase in care-giving activities.  
In contrast, however, if the initial equilibrium were represented by a low utilization 
equilibrium, M<m, in which the household did not fully exhaust its maximum allocation 
of publicly financed care, m, household behavior would be invariant to a marginal change 
in this maximum allocation. 
  Finally, if the initial equilibrium were represented by a corner solution, M=m, a 
marginal change in the maximum allocation of publicly financed care yields a relative 
price effect.  This effect, which is associated with a reduction in the effective unit cost of 
in-home care from P to (P-s), yields a substitution away from care-giving time, C, 
towards more in-home care, M, and also yields an increase in care recipient performance 
ability, A.  Thus, in the case of a corner solution, whereby the household only exhausts 
the public allocation of care, an increase in that allocation results in a decrease in 
informal care-giving activities as publicly financed care substitutes for household care-
giving activities. Moreover, this increased allocation of public care increases the 
household’s consumption of leisure time and market goods and services. 
  In sum, if households supplement publicly financed home care with private care, 
an increase in the public allocation yields an income effect that increases care-giving 
activities.  In contrast, if households fully exhaust, but do not supplement the public 
allocation of care, an increase in that allocation results in a price effect that lowers care-
giving activities.  In both cases, care recipient performance ability is enhanced.  Because 
the cost (P-s) of publicly financed care is relatively low and the cost (P) of private care is 
relatively large, most Canadians fully exhaust their public allocation (m) without 
supplementing such care with services from the private sector, m*=0. Consequently, an    9   
increase in the public allocation of home care is anticipated to decrease care-giving, C, to 
increase the utilization of formal care, M, and to increase the performance ability of the 
care recipient, A. 
4.0  Public home care in Canada 
  Home care in Canada is administered at the provincial level. Provinces are not 
obligated to provide in-home care under the Canada Health Act, but every province 
provides some amount of public home care to its residents. All provinces offer a similar 
basic range of services, including nursing services and personal support. Other services 
are offered to varying degrees across the country. In this Section, some inter-provincial 
differences in home care programs are sketched.  A more detailed description can be 
found in Health Canada (1999).  
  The provinces differ in the eligibility requirements for in-home services. Seven 
provinces have income tests to determine co-payments for personal support services.  
Two other provinces, Quebec and Manitoba, do not have a formal income cutoff, but do 
prioritize service provision based on a household’s available private alternatives, be they 
formal or informal care. The remaining province, Ontario, has no formal income 
assessment program.  
  Provinces also differ in the maximum amount of publicly insured in-home care 
provided to an individual.  For example, Alberta has an upper limit of $3,000 per month 
and Nova Scotia has an upper limit of $2,200 per month.  Some provinces impose 
restrictions on the maximum number of hours for in-home personal support, such as 
Quebec at 40 hours per week, and Ontario at 80 hours in the first month of service and 60 
hours per month thereafter.     10   
  The method by which individuals gain access to home care also varies across 
provinces. While many provinces have moved towards a standard assessment tool, the 
tools vary from province to province. Physician referrals are required in some, but not all 
provinces. In some provinces nurses can request access to home care services and in 
others care recipients themselves may self-refer.  
  One way of summarizing the varying degrees of generosity in home care 
programs is by looking at differences in the share of provincial public health spending 
devoted to home care. Table 1 shows this for selected years between 1992-1998. While 
there has been an upward trend in the share of health spending devoted to home care, the 
level and its rate of growth differ significantly across provinces.  In 1998, Ontario’s share 
was 5.3 percent and New Brunswick’s was 5.8 percent, while Prince Edward Island’s 
share was 2.3 percent.  Nova Scotia has had dramatic growth (from 1.5 percent to 5.1 
percent) compared with provinces such as B.C. and PEI. While it is this variation in home 
care program generosity that will be used to empirically test the model of household 
decision-making, other measures are reported in Appendix A. 
5.0 Data 
  We use two data sources for our analysis. The first data source is the public use 
file from the National Population Health Survey (NPHS). The NPHS collects family and 
individual information on health status and utilization as well as demographic data. The 
survey was conducted in 1994/95, 1996/97, and 1998/99 and all three rounds are used in 
our analysis. For a single-family member, 12 years of age and older, a more detailed 
survey of health and use of health care is conducted. We use this “health file” and 
examine individuals 45 years of age and older. The NPHS asks two series of questions    11   
that are particularly useful for our analysis. The first inquires whether an individual 
needed various forms of home care over the past twelve months. Questions pertain to the 
need for help with daily activities to the need for more specialized home care. A second 
set of questions concern whether individuals received home care over the past twelve 
months. This in-home care is specified to be formal, and the question stipulates that the 
cost should be partially or fully paid for by the government. Again, the questions range 
from receiving help with meals to help from medical professionals.  We use these 
questions as well as the other information on health and demographics to examine 
differences in the need and use of home care by provinces over time in Canada between 
1994 and 1998.  
  The second set of data used was derived from the General Social Survey (GSS) 
for 1992, 1994, and 1996. Again, this is a national survey that asks a series of questions 
to a random sample of Canadians. The 1992 survey focused on the use of time, the 1994 
survey on education, work and retirement, and the 1996 survey on social and community 
support. While the surveys did not ask the same set of questions from year to year, in 
each year the surveys asked individuals about whether or not they provided informal 
home care. These surveys also collect demographic information about the respondent. 
We use these surveys to examine differences in delivery of informal home care by 
households by province and over time between 1992 and 1996. Means and standard 
deviations for the main variables used are presented in Table 2. 
  Information on the generosity of public home care programs by province was 
added to both of these data sets. We used the share of public health spending devoted to 
in-home care by province as our measure of public home care generosity. One concern    12   
with this measure is that the supply of public home care measured in this fashion is not 
completely exogenous. However, two points are worth noting. First, demand for public 
home care exceeds available supply of care in every province (see Table 3). Second, 
provinces with high demand for home care services will have high demand for service in 
many areas of the health care system, not just home care. Therefore, the relative spending 
on home care versus other health care inputs should be a reasonable measure of home 
care program generosity and not simply a reflection of high use. However to further 
address concerns over the potential endgoenity of this measure of public generosity, we 
also instrument for public home care generosity. Three exogenous variables are used as 
instruments.  These are correlated with the generosity of the public home care program, 
but not with decisions to seek or provide care: the share of the population aged 65 and 
older in each province over time; the level of provincial spending on education in each 
province over time; and the provincial tax rate as a share of federal taxes in each province 
over time
3.  As a specification check, we repeated all analyses using per capita home care 
expenditures as our measure of public program generosity.  Our results are not sensitive 
to this alternative measure of generosity.  As such, we only report the results using shares 
of public health spending. 
6.0  Home Care Trends Across Canada 
  The NPHS was used to demonstrate differences in home care needs and use 
across Canada in 1994, 1996 and 1998 (see Table 3). Two features are immediately clear. 
First, self-reported rates of need exceed the self-reported rates of use for all provinces 
                                                 
3 For Quebec, which administers its own provincial tax system, we use the top marginal rate in the province 
for each year.    13   
over the study period.  While approximately 6 percent of the population over 45 years of 
age received in-home care, the proportion reporting need for such services was about 20 
percent.  Second, there were wide inter-provincial variations in self-reported need and use 
of home care.  While there was a threefold variation in the use of home care over the 
study period, variation in the need for home care fell from about 2.0 to 1.5 between 1994 
and 1998. 
  Given the differences across provinces in both the perceived need for and use of 
home care, it is important to control for provincial differences when assessing the impact 
of home care program generosity on household behavior.  We examine the correlates of 
both the need for and use of in-home care across Canada.  Our dependent variable is 
whether individuals reported in-home service use in the given year and is specified as: 
(4)  ijt j prov t year ijt X jt pubprog ijt care home ε β β β β β + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0  
where individuals are indexed by i, time by t, and provinces by j.  Pubprog measures the 
generosity of provincial public home care programs; X is a vector of demographic 
characteristics, including age, sex, marital status, family income, education, home 
ownership, and self-reported health status. This vector also includes lagged per capita 
public health care spending in each province to help control for changes in the overall 
level of spending on health care in a province over time.  Dummy variables are also 
included for year, year, and province, prov. 
  The results from examining the determinants of home care use are reported in 
Table 4. The first column reports the marginal effects from probit estimates of the 
probability of using home care. Many of the demographic variables influence the use of 
home care as anticipated.  Estimates suggest that men are less likely to use home care    14   
than women. Married individuals are less likely to use home care than single individuals. 
Both of these results are consistent with families trading off formal for informal care 
when informal care is available.  While individuals with higher family income are less 
likely to use home care, those with more education are more likely to use home care. One 
possible explanation for this result in that income is picking up the income cutoff in many 
provinces, and that conditional on income, individuals with more education are likely to 
be more aware of publicly available services. Older individuals and individuals who 
report lower health status are more likely to use home care. Lagged per capita public 
health care spending is not correlated with the probability of using home care. Home 
ownership is negatively correlated with the use of home care. This might reflect 
individuals’ discomfort with having potential strangers caring for them in their own 
home.  Previous literature examining the tradeoffs between home care and nursing homes 
have found that home ownership is a strong predictor for receipt of in-home care (Cutler 
and Sheiner, 1993). However, our sample does not include institutionalized individuals, 
and hence, the tradeoff here is between receiving care at home or not receiving care at all. 
The decision to enter a nursing home was not considered here
4.   
 The generosity of the public program is positively and significantly correlated 
with the use of home care. Again, the identifying variation in public program generosity 
is within provinces over time since the regression includes both province and year 
dummies. That more individuals receive care when public program generosity increases 
is not particularly surprising and is consistent with the model outlined above. 
                                                 
4 In alternate specifications, we control for individual’s living arrangements. We find that living alone is a 
significant predictor of using care, but that it has no effect on the magnitude or significance of the other 
coefficients of interest.      15   
  The instrumental variable (IV) results, after instruments are used for the 
generosity of public home care programs, are reported in the second column of Table 4.  
The F-statistic on the excluded instruments (proportion of the population over 65 years, 
per capita education spending, and average provincial tax rate) is 2142 and the complete 
first stage results are reported in Appendix B.  The IV results (run as linear probability 
models and correcting for provincial clustering) are similar in sign and significance to the 
probit results. The coefficient for the public generosity variable is still significant and 
slightly larger than the probit marginal effect. 
  A potential concern with increasing the generosity of public home care programs 
is that there will be a moral hazard response resulting in more individuals reporting the 
need for care. One way of checking for such as response is to examine whether or not an 
individual claims to need home care is a function of provincial program generosity (Table 
5).  Here, as above, the dependent variable takes on a value of one if an individual self-
reports a need for home care. Most of the demographic variables have their expected 
effect on the probability that an individual needs home care.  Women are more likely to 
report needing care than men. Married individuals are less likely to report need.  Family 
income is not a significant determinant of need.  More educated and older individuals are 
more likely to self-report a need for home care, and individuals who report poor health 
status are also more likely to report need. In this case, the generosity of public home care 
programs is not significantly correlated with self-reported needs for home care. 
  The IV results are reported in the second column of Table 5. The results look 
much the same as the probit results, with no significant correlation between the 
generosity of public home care programs and the self-reported need for home care.     16   
The model outlined above predicts that more generous public programs will 
increase the amount of formally provided care, M, regardless of whether individuals are 
initially using both publicly and privately financed care, M>m, or only using publicly 
financed care, M=m.  In this case, if provinces increase the generosity of their public 
programs, more individuals in need of care should receive publicly funded care. That is, 
conditional on claiming to need care, the generosity of the public program should have a 
positive effect on the probability of receiving care. To test this hypothesis, we condition 
the sample on those individuals who claim to need care and generate a dependent variable 
equal to 1 if the respondent received care. We then estimate the following equation: 
(5)  ijt j t ijt jt ijt prov year X pubprog need receive ε γ γ γ γ γ + + + + + = = = 4 3 2 1 0 ) 1 | 1 (  
The results from estimating equation (5) are reported in Table 6. More generous public 
programs are positively and significantly correlated with receiving care conditional on 
needing care, as predicted by the model. When we instrument for the generosity of the 
public home care program the coefficient is almost identical, but the standard error is 
large and therefore the coefficient is no longer significantly different from zero. The 
effects of some of the other covariates are also worth noting. Higher income individuals 
are less likely to receive care conditional on needing it. This may reflect differences in 
perceived need, although we do not find that individuals with more education have the 
same result. As noted above, this may also reflect some of the income restrictions in 
certain provinces.  Lagged per capita health care spending in not significant. Home 
ownership is negatively correlated with receiving care conditional on needing care. There 
are significantly negative year effects (not reported in the Table) suggesting that the    17   
probability of receiving care given that you need it decreased significantly throughout the 
1990s. 
7.0  Health Status and Public Home Care Programs 
 
  A further prediction from the model is that an increase in the generosity of public 
home care programs will result in an increase in a care recipient’s “performance ability”. 
While we are unable to fully measure performance ability using the NPHS, we can 
measure the recipient’s self-reported health status. To do this we create a dichotomous 
variable equal to one if the respondent claims that they are in good health or better (the 
first three categories on the five category scale) and zero otherwise. We then regress self-
reported health status on the set of demographic controls, outlined above, and the 
generosity of public home care programs. Our results are summarized in Table 7. Our 
estimates are consistent with the theoretical model, namely that self-reported health status 
is positively correlated with the generosity of public home care programs. A one 
percentage point increase in the fraction of public health care budgets devoted to home 
care correlates with a 1.6 percentage point increase in the probability of self-reporting 
good health or better.   The IV estimates of the effects of the generosity of public home 
care programs are larger (2.4 percentage points) and also significant and supportive of the 
hypothesis derived from the simple theoretical model
5. 
8.0  Informal Care Givers and Public Home Care Programs 
  In this Section, we examine whether the generosity of public home care programs 
effect household time allocations between informal care-giving, leisure and labour 
                                                 
5 The results reported here are for the entire sample. We also restrict the sample to only those individuals 
reporting to be in need of care. The results are qualitatively identical for this group.      18   
market activities.  The General Social Survey (GSS) yields data on the incidence of 
informal care-giving, however, the questions posed in each study year are not identical.  
In 1992, the survey asked whether respondents provided care for someone ill in the last 
month. The 1994 survey asked about providing unpaid care to seniors or others who are 
not the respondent’s children, and the 1996 survey asked whether the respondent gave 
any informal care to others in the past 12 months.  As such, there may be shifts in the 
level of care-giving across years due to the domains assessed by each question.  The 
regression analysis controlled for these shifts through use of year effects. 
  Wide inter-provincial variation in care-giving over the study period is reported in 
Table 8.  While 7.9 percent of Quebecers reported care-giving activities in 1992, 13.3 
percent of Ontarians and 22.4 percent of Newfoundlanders reported such activities. The 
provincial dummies in our regression analysis pick up the differences that are constant 
over time. 
  The simple theoretical model suggests that a household’s care-giving response to 
changes in the allocation of public home care is contingent on its resource base.  If the 
household fully exhausts its allocation of public home care and supplements such care 
with private home care, an increase in the generosity of the public home care program 
would yield an income effect that results in a complementary increase in informal care-
giving activities.  However, if a household did not supplement its public allocation, an 
increase in the generosity of the public home care program would yield a substitution 
effect that lowers informal care-giving activities. 
We use the GSS surveys and a regression specification similar to the ones 
outlined above to assess the determinants of care-giving activities after controlling for    19   
underlying demographic characteristics and the generosity of public home care programs.  
Our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the individual reports 
providing informal care-giving and zero otherwise. To account for the hypothesized 
differential effect of public programs on care-giving activities, we included an interaction 
term in the regression equal to the product of the generosity of the public home care 
program and a dummy variable for family income greater than or equal to $50,000.   
  The regression results are reported in Table 9.  Consistent with the literature, the 
estimates suggest women are more likely to engage in care-giving activities than men.  
The relationship between care-giving activities and the respondent’s age follows an 
inverted U-shaped relationship, peaking at age seventy-five.  Interestingly, household 
income is not correlated with providing informal care, however, individuals with more 
education or working fewer hour are more likely to engage in care-giving activities.  
These results are consistent with the labor and care-giving tradeoff outlined in the 
theoretical model. 
  Theory suggests that an increase in the generosity of public home care programs 
will increase care-giving activities for high-income households and decrease such care-
giving activities for lower income households.  This occurs because an increase in the 
generosity of public home care programs yields an income effect for those who 
supplement public care with private care, and a substitution effect for those who only 
fully exhaust their allocation of public care.  Our results are consistent with this 
hypothesis. In our probit results, public program generosity is negatively and 
significantly correlated with care-giving activities and the interaction effect is positive 
and significant.  For the IV specification, the coefficients are again negative for public    20   
program generosity and positive for the interaction term, but in this case the coefficients 
are no longer significantly different from zero
6.  
  In sum, variations in the generosity of the public home care program affect care-
giving activities.  Our probit estimates suggest that there is an inverse relationship 
between household care-giving activities and the generosity of public home care 
programs, and that this relationship is smaller among higher income households. The IV 
results are similar although the standard errors are larger than in the probit specification. 
As noted in our theoretical analysis, because the cost of publicly financed care is 
relatively low and the cost of private care is relatively large, most Canadians fully 
exhaust their public allocation without supplementing such care with services from the 
private sector, M=m.  In this corner solution, the theory predicts that an increase in the 
generosity of public home care programs lowers the relative cost of formal care, and 
thereby, results in a substitution away from care-giving time, C, towards m, which is 
consistent with our empirical findings.  
9.0  Summary and Conclusions 
  We present a simple model of household decision making to better understand 
how households respond to changes in publicly provided home care services. We then 
test the predictions of that model using data on home care use and care-giving in Canada.   
  The theoretical predictions and empirical results are consistent with the 
anticipated effects of the generosity of public programs on household decision-making.  
Our results demonstrate that the increased availability of publicly financed home care is 
                                                 
6 Here our instruments include the three instruments outlined above as well as interactions between the 
instruments and the dummy variable for family income greater than $50,000.    21   
associated with an increase in its utilization and a decline in informal care-giving, with 
this effect more pronounced among lower income Canadians.  While self-reported health 
status was positively correlated with the increased availability of publicly financed home 
care, the perceived need for home care was invariant to this change. 
The result that an increase in public program generosity leads to an increase in 
self-reported health status has not, to our knowledge, been reported in the literature.  In 
itself, this result suggests that increased support for the home as a setting for the 
provision of care may improve health status.  This finding is robust to both our probit 
estimates and our instrumental variables estimates.  
The finding that an increase in the generosity of public programs was correlated 
with a decline in informal care-giving is consistent with an initial equilibrium in which 
care recipients’ fully exhaust their public allocation of care without supplementing such 
care with services from the private sector.  From a health policy perspective, however, 
this response by household care-givers undermines, but does not eliminate, the potential 
benefits derived by care recipients through the increased availability of formal in-home 
care.  This finding suggests that improvements in the generosity of public home care 
programs are shared by all members of the household, both care-giver and care recipient, 
and are not captured exclusively by the care recipient.     22   
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Table 1: Fraction of Provincial Health Care Budget Devoted to Home Care (in %) 
 
Province/Year  1992  1994 1996 1998 
Newfoundland  3.1    4.1  4.4    5.2 
PEI  2.0   1.7    2.1    2.3 
Nova Scotia  1.5    2.0    4.3    5.1 
New Brunswick  4.0    5.1    5.5     5.8 
Quebec  1.9    1.9     2.2    2.4 
Ontario  3.3    4.8    5.0     5.3 
Manitoba  3.5    3.7   5.4    5.0 
Saskatchewan  2.2    3.4    3.9    3.9 
Alberta  1.6    2.2    2.8    2.8 
B.C.  2.7    2.9    3.1     3.1 
 
Source: Statistics Canada and CIHI    24   
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Primary Explanatory Variables  
 
Variable NPHS  GSS 
Number of Obs.  46924  34447 
Age: 15-24  --  0.12 
   (0.33) 
Age: 25-34  --  0.19 
   (0.39) 
Age: 35-44  --  0.17   
    (0.38)   
Age: 45-54  0.33  0.11 
 (0.47)  (0.32) 
Age:55-64 0.25  0.11 
 (0.44)    (0.31) 
Age:65-69 (NPHS), 65-74 (GSS)  0.12  0.18 
  (0.33)  (0.38)   
Age:70+ (NPHS), 75+ (GSS)  0.29  0.11 
 (0.45)  (0.31)   
Less than high school  0.39  0.34   
 (0.49)    (0.48) 
High School  0.15  0.19 
 (0.36)  (0.39) 
Some College  0.31  0.33 
 (0.46)  (0.47) 
College 0.15  0.14 
 (0.35)  (0.34) 
Income (in 000):  0  0.01 0.00 
 (0.08)  (0.05) 
Income: 0-5  0.01  0.01 
 (0.08)  (0.10) 
Income: 5-10  0.05  0.06 
 (0.21)  (0.23) 
Income 10-15  0.13  0.09 
 (0.34)    (0.29) 
Income: 15-20  0.12  0.10 
 (0.32)  (0.31) 
Income: 20-30  0.18  0.17 
 (0.38)  (0.37) 
Income: 30-40  0.14  0.15 
 (0.35)  (0.35) 
Income: 40-50  0.10  0.12 
 (0.30)  (0.33) 
Income: 50-60  0.09  0.10 
 (0.28)  (0.30) 
Income: 60-80  0.08  0.10 
 (0.28)  (0.30) 
Income: 80+ (NPHS),  80-100 (GSS)  0.10  0.08 
 (0.30)  (0.27) 
Income 100+  --  0.02 
 --  (0.13) 
Male 0.44  0.56 
 (0.50)  (0.50) 
Married 0.61  0.66 
 (0.49)  (0.47) 
Notes: Source is NPHS 94,96, 98 and GSS 92,94,96. Means are pooled across three sample years for both NPHS and 
GSS. All variables represent the proportion of individuals in each category. The sample for the NPHS contains 
individuals 45 years and older only. The sample for the GSS contains individuals ages 15 years and older.  
Categories may not sum to 1 due to rounding.     25   
 
Table 3: Home care need and use by province (in percent) 
 
Province/Year 1994  1996  1998 
  Need Use Need Use Need Use 
NFLD  16.6 3.0 20.0 2.7 22.5 3.8 
PEI  25.1 6.8 32.3 6.6 26.5 3.9 
NS  27.6 5.0 28.6 7.3 30.7 8.7 
NB  20.1 7.2 27.8 6.8 26.1 6.1 
QUE  14.1 4.1 19.1 3.7 21.2 4.3 
ONT  20.0 6.9 19.6 6.3 26.1 7.7 
MB  18.7 5.1 22.1 5.9 26.8 6.9 
SASK  26.3 10.8  26.8 9.4 26.6 9.0 
AB  16.3 4.1 19.5 5.0 21.2 3.6 
BC  19.8 8.8 25.4 7.7 25.6 6.1 
CANADA  19.8 6.4 20.6 6.0 25.1 6.1 
Source: NPHS 1994, 96, 98 
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Table 4: Determinant of Use of Home Care
N=38153  Any Home Care 
Use - Probit 
Any Home Care Use -IV 
Public Program Generosity  0.0078**  0.016** 
  (0.0018)  (0.005)      
Male -0.0051**  -0.011** 
  (0.0011)  (0.002)      
Married -0.0091**  -0.014** 
  (0.0015)  (0.002)      
Income (in 000):  0  -0.0054  -0.028* 
  (0.0060)  (0.011)      
Income: 0-5  -0.0054  -0.040** 
  (0.010)  (0.022)     
Income: 5-10  -0.0017  -0.018** 
  (0.0013)  (0.006)      
Income: 15-20  -0.0092**  -0.037** 
  (0.0018)  (0.007)      
Income: 20-30  -0.016**  -0.048** 
  (0.0017)  (0.006)      
Income: 30-40  -0.017**  -0.047** 
  (0.0030)  (0.008)      
Income: 40-50  -0.023**  -0.048** 
  (0.0024)  (0.007)      
Income: 50-60  -0.027**  -0.046** 
  (0.0021)  (0.007)      
Income: 60-80  -0.025**  -0.042** 
  (0.0067)  (0.008)      
Income: 80+  -0.030**  -0.041** 
  (0.0036)  (0.007)      
High school  0.0054**  0.0095** 
  (0.0018)  (0.003)       
Some college  0.0046**  0.0079** 
  (0.0010)  (0.002)       
College 0.011**  0.015** 
  (0.0025)  (0.004)       
Age: 55-64  0.0091**  0.0028** 
  (0.0013)  (0.001)       
Age: 65-69  0.026**  0.022** 
  (0.0017)  (0.003)       
Age: 70+  0.057**  0.107** 
  (0.0019)  (0.004)      
Health: V. Good  0.016**  0.0078** 
  (0.0023)  (0.002)       
Health: Good  0.030**  0.024** 
  (0.0028)  (0.004)       
Health: Fair  0.052**  0.081** 
  (0.0030)  (0.007)      
Health: Poor  0.084**  0.216** 
  (0.0040)  (0.012)      
Lagged Public Health Care Expenditure  -0.00001*  -- 
 (0.00001)  -- 
Own Dwelling  -0.010**  -0.022** 
  (0.0025)  (0.007)     
Constant -0.149**  -0.028 
  (0.010)  (0.015)      
Source: 1994/96/98 NPHS. Robust, cluster corrected standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include province 
and year fixed effects.  Probit Marginal Effects reported for column 1 and linear probability models for column 2.  **  
and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.     27   
Table 5: Determinants of Reporting to Need Care
N=38153  Need Home Care–
Probit 
Need Home Care-IV 
Public Program Generosity  0.0024  0.030 
  (0.0098)  (0.023)     
Male -0.089**  -0.081** 
  (0.0058)  (0.006)     
Married -0.028**  -0.030** 
  (0.0037)  (0.003)      
Income (in 000):  0  -0.038**  -0.059** 
  (0.013)  (0.014)      
Income: 0-5  -0.0075  -0.023 
  (0.029)  (0.035)      
Income: 5-10  0.0072  0.0023 
  (0.012)  (0.014)       
Income: 15-20  -0.026**  -0.041** 
  (0.0040)  (0.006)      
Income: 20-30  -0.035**  -0.052** 
  (0.0047)  (0.007)      
Income: 30-40  -0.049**  -0.064** 
  (0.0060)  (0.008)      
Income: 40-50  -0.070**  -0.071** 
  (0.0058)  (0.007)     
Income: 50-60  -0.049**  -0.054** 
  (0.012)  (0.013)     
Income: 60-80  -0.066**  -0.061** 
  (0.014)  (0.013)      
Income: 80+  -0.080**  -0.064** 
  (0.015)  (0.013)     
High school  0.0039  0.0068 
  (0.011)  (0.009)       
Some college  0.036**  0.034** 
  (0.0039)  (0.004)       
College 0.041**  0.037** 
  (0.011)  (0.009)       
Age: 55-64  0.040**  0.023** 
  (0.0058)  (0.004)       
Age: 65-69  0.084**  0.062** 
  (0.0090)  (0.009)       
Age: 70+  0.207**  0.219** 
  (0.011)  (0.016)      
Health: V. Good  0.076**  0.034** 
  (0.0084)  (0.004)       
Health: Good  0.193**  0.138** 
  (0.0071)  (0.005)     
Health: Fair  0.342**  0.353** 
  (0.010)  (0.011)      
Health: Poor  0.511**  0.603** 
  (0.017)  (0.017 )     
Lagged Public Health Care 
Expenditure 
-0.00003 -- 
 (0.00005)  -- 
Own Dwelling  -0.016**  -0.018** 
  (0.0051)  (0.007)      
Constant -0.355**  -0.035 
  (0.077)  (0.093)      
Source: 1994/96/98 NPHS. Robust, cluster corrected standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include province 
and year fixed effects.  Probit Marginal Effects reported for column 1 and linear probability models for column 2. **  
and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.     28   





Receiving Care -IV 
Public Program 
Generosity 
0.039**  0.037    
  (0.012)  (0.022)       
Male  0.037**  0.030**   
  (0.0084)  (0.008)       
Married  -0.023*  -0.017    
  (0.013)  (0.014)      
Income (in 000):  0  0.013  0.006    
  (0.044)  (0.051)       
Income: 0-5  -0.0040  -0.027   
  (0.050)  (0.051)      
Income: 5-10  -0.0092  -0.023 
  (0.015)  (0.018)     
Income: 15-20  -0.053**  -0.065)    
  (0.015)  (0.016)     
Income: 20-30  -0.085**  -0.097**    
  (0.012)  (0.014)     
Income: 30-40  -0.103**  -0.111**  
  (0.025)  (0.027)     
Income: 40-50  -0.129**  -0.125**  
 (0.021)  (0.023)   
Income: 50-60  -0.176**  -0.152** 
  (0.024)  (0.019)      
Income: 60-80  -0.192**  -0.159** 
  (0.040)  (0.029)      
Income: 80+  -0.179**  -0.149** 
  (0.021)  (0.017)      
High school  0.0080  0.009    
  (0.018)  (0.017)       
Some college  -0.0038  -0.005    
  (0.0076)  (0.007)     
College  0.018  0.012    
  (0.025)  (0.024)       
Age: 55-64  0.045**  0.021** 
  (0.012)  (0.008)       
Age: 65-69  0.127**  0.084** 
  (0.0099)  (0.014)       
Age: 70+  0.242**  0.208** 
  (0.0088)  (0.014)      
Lagged Public Health 
Care Expenditure 
-0.00012 -- 
 (0.00008)  -- 
Own Dwelling  -0.046**  -0.048** 
  (0.011)  (0.013)      
Constant  -0.350**  -0.036    
  (0.123)  (0.080)      
Source: 1994/96/98 NPHS. Robust, cluster corrected standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include province 
and year fixed effects.  Probit Marginal Effects reported for column 1 and linear probability models for column 2. **  
and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.     29   
Table 7: Being in Good Health and Public Home Care 
N=38153 Good  Health- 
Probit 
Good Health- IV 
Public Program Generosity  0.016**  0.024** 
 (0.0042)  (0.0053) 
Male -0.017**  -0.017** 
 (0.0046)  (0.0050) 
Married -0.022**  -0.024** 
 (0.0034)  (0.0033) 
Income (in 000):  0  0.0042  0.0099 
 (0.018)  (0.025) 
Income: 0-5  -0.045**  -0.061** 
 (0.014)  (0.020) 
Income: 5-10  -0.060**  -0.086** 
 (0.015)  (0.022) 
Income: 15-20  0.040**  0.055** 
 (0.0087)  (0.011) 
Income: 20-30  0.074**  0.096** 
 (0.0078)  (0.0086) 
Income: 30-40  0.105**  0.129** 
 (0.0024)  (0.0042) 
Income: 40-50  0.149**  0.168** 
 (0.0065)  (0.0063) 
Income: 50-60  0.174**  0.183** 
 (0.011)  (0.010) 
Income: 60-80  0.197**  0.195** 
 (0.0077)  (0.0078) 
Income: 80+  0.218**  0.204** 
 (0.015)  (0.0079) 
High school  0.072**  0.079** 
 (0.0051)  (0.0059) 
Some college  0.062**  0.070** 
 (0.0058)  (0.0060) 
College 0.108**  0.099** 
 (0.0067)  (0.0058) 
Age: 55-64  -0.023**  -0.019** 
 (0.0052)  (0.0046) 
Age: 65-69  -0.0078  -0.0011 
 (0.0060)  (0.0062) 
Age: 70+  -0.044**  -0.043** 
 (0.0049)  (0.0052) 
Lagged Public Health Care 
Expenditure 
0.00002 0.043** 
 (0.00004)  (0.0079) 
Own Dwelling  0.037**  0.609** 
 (0.0072)  (0.032) 
Constant 0.052  0.024** 
 (0.052)  (0.0053) 
Source: 1994/96/98 NPHS. Robust, cluster corrected standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include province 
and year fixed effects.  Probit Marginal Effects reported for column 1 and linear probability models for column 2. **  
and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.     30   
 
Table 8: Percentage of Respondents Reporting to Provide Informal Care-Giving by 
Province
Province/  Year 1992 1994 1996 
NFLD  22.4 33.7 18.9 
PEI  15.7 33.8 23.6 
NS  18.4 31.7 19.8 
NB  14.1 24.1 11.4 
QUE 7.9  14.8  11.5 
ONT  13.3 15.2 11.8 
MB  12.7 19.2 13.3 
SASK  13.8 22.9 12.3 
AB  13.0 16.9 12.1 
BC 9.5  20.0  13.4 
CANADA  12.7 20.0 13.2 
Source: 1992/94/96 GSS    31   
 
Table 9: Determinants of giving care 
N=13870  Give Care-- Probit  Give Care- IV 
Public Program Generosity  -0.028*  -0.0088 
 (0.015)  (0.055) 
Public Program Generosity* Income>50,000  0.0040*  0.0014 
 (0.0021)  (0.0032) 
Age: 25-34  0.015  0.016* 
 (0.010)  (0.0087) 
Age: 35-44  0.061**  0.060** 
 (0.0085)  (0.0084) 
Age: 45-54  0.087**  0.087** 
 (0.014)  (0.012) 
Age:55-64 0.084**  0.087** 
 (0.011)  (0.0086) 
Age:65-74 0.069**  0.071** 
 (0.012)  (0.015) 
Age:75+ 0.034**  0.031* 
 (0.016)  (0.018) 
High School  0.016  0.018 
 (0.012)  (0.012) 
Some College  0.039**  0.041** 
 (0.015)  (0.016) 
College 0.042**  0.041** 
 (0.015)  (0.016) 
Male -0.028**  -0.028** 
 (0.0096)  (0.010) 
HH Income (in 000): 0  --  -0.187** 
 --  (0.039) 
HH Income: <5  -0.026  -0.031 
 (0.043)  (0.045) 
HH Income:5-10  -0.034  -0.039 
 (0.025)  (0.028) 
HH Income: 15-20  -0.019  -0.024 
 (0.023)  (0.026) 
HH Income: 20-30  -0.0062  -0.0090 
 (0.012)  (0.014) 
HH Income: 30-40  -0.013  -0.015 
 (0.017)  (0.019) 
HH Income: 40-50  -0.021*  -0.023* 
 (0.011)  (0.013) 
HH Income: 50-60  -0.019  -0.013 
 (0.016)  (0.023) 
HH Income: 60-80  -0.013  -0.0076 
 (0.021)  (0.026) 
HH Income: 80-100  0.0077  0.013 
 (0.017)  (0.021) 
HH Income:100+  -0.012  -0.0097 
 (0.025)  (0.030) 
Per Income (in 000): 0  0.072*  0.065 
 (0.042)  (0.046) 
Per Income: <5  0.018  0.020 
 (0.012)  (0.013) 
Per Income:5-9  -0.0014  -0.0033 
 (0.020)  (0.022) 
Per Income: 15-20  -0.0031  -0.0026 
 (0.018)  (0.018) 
Per Income: 20-30  -0.0039  -0.0053 
 (0.019)  (0.021) 
Per Income: 30-40  -0.016  -0.016    32   
 (0.021)  (0.022) 
Per Income: 40-50  -0.0049  -0.0041 
 (0.025)  (0.026) 
Per Income: 50-60  -0.033**  -0.033* 
 (0.017)  (0.017) 
Per Income: 60-80  -0.066**  -0.064** 
 (0.030)  (0.030) 
Per Income: 80-100  -0.048  -0.048 
 (0.043)  (0.041) 
Per Income:100+  -0.036  -0.037 
 (0.043)  (0.045) 
Hours Worked  -0.00060**  -0.00065** 
 (0.00030)  (0.00029) 
Married -0.010  -0.012 
 (0.0088)  (0.0084) 
Lagged Public Health Care Expenditure  0.00008*  0.264 
 (0.00004)  (0.194) 
Constant -0.227**  0.016* 
 (0.088)  (0.0087) 
 
Source: 1992/94/96 GSS. . Robust, cluster corrected standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include province 
and year fixed effects.  Probit Marginal Effects reported for column 1 and linear probability models for column 2. **  
and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Appendix A: 
Measures of Public Home Care Generosity, 1996-97 
Province  Total Home Care Exp/ 
Capita ($) 
Home Care/ Public 
Health Expenditure 
(%) 
Home Care Expenditure/ 
Care Recipient ($) 
NLFD 78.7  4.4   N/A 
PEI 30.8  2.1  1923.9 
NS 68.2  4.3  3589.2 
NB 90.9  5.5  2273.3 
QUE 36.8  2.2  800.8 
ONT 89.1  5.0  3073.9 
MB 99.3  5.3  4136.5 
SASK 66.1  3.9  2359.7 
AB 51.2  2.8  2226.6 
BC 59.8  3.1  1931.1 
 
Source: Statistics Canada and CIHI    34   
Appendix B 
 
First Stage OLS Results for the Generosity of Provincial Home Care Programs 






































Income:  0  -0.0075 
(in 000)  (0.016) 
Income: 0-5  -0.027 
 (0.018) 
Income: 5-10  -0.0028 
 (0.0069) 
Income: 15-20  0.0015 
 (0.0048) 
Income: 20-30  0.0053 
 (0.0044) 
Income: 30-40  0.0041 
 (0.0047) 
Income: 40-50  0.0058 
 (0.0051) 
Income: 50-60  0.0048    35   
 (0.0053) 
Income: 60-80  0.012** 
 (0.0053) 
Income: 80+  0.0085 
 (0.0053) 
High school  0.00039 
 (0.0033) 




Age: 55-64  0.0061** 
 (0.0029) 
Age: 65-69  0.0035 
 (0.0039) 






Health: Good  0.0064* 
 (0.0033) 
Health: Fair  -0.0017 
 (0.0043) 
Health: Poor  0.0037 
 (0.0060) 
Own dwelling  0.0025 
 (0.0028) 
Source: 1994-1998 NPHS and provincial level data from Statistics Canada. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The excluded instruments are the average provincial tax rate, per capita provincial educational 
spending, and the percent of the population ages 65 and over.  **  and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% 
levels respectively.  
 